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Previous studies have shown that social comparison inﬂuences individual’s fairness con-
sideration and other-regarding behavior. However, it is not clear how social comparison
affects the brain activity in evaluating fairness during asset distribution. In this study, par-
ticipants, acting as recipients in the ultimatum game, were informed not only of offers
to themselves but also of the average amount of offers in other allocator–recipient dyads.
Behavioral results showed that the participants were more likely to reject division schemes
when they were offered less than the other recipients, especially when the offers were
highly unequal. Event-related brain potentials recorded from the participants showed that
highly unequal offers elicitedmore negative-goingmedial frontal negativity thanmoderately
unequal offers in an early time window (270–360ms) and this effect was not signiﬁcantly
modulated by social comparison. In a later time window (450–650ms), however, the late
positive potential (LPP) was more positive for moderately unequal offers than for highly
unequal offers when the other recipients were offered less than the participants, whereas
this distinction disappeared when the other recipients were offered the same as or more
than the participants.These ﬁndings suggest that the brain activity in evaluating fairness in
asset division entails both an earlier (semi-) automatic process in which the brain responds
to fairness at an abstract level and a later appraisal process in which factors related to social
comparison and fairness norms come into play.
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INTRODUCTION
Fairness is important in interpersonal interaction and for social
stability. A large number of studies, employing different para-
digms, show that people demand fairness in wealth allocation and
arewilling to sacriﬁce economic interests to punishunfair behavior
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Camerer, 2003). One way to investigate
fairness consideration in asset division is to let individuals play
economic exchange games, like the ultimatum game (UG; Güth
et al.,1982),and to examine these individuals’behavioral responses
and/or brain activities. In the standard UG, two players have to
divide a certain amount of money between them. One player is
the allocator and proposes a division of the money; the other is
the recipient and can either accept or reject the division scheme. If
the recipient accepts, the asset is divided as proposed. If the recip-
ient rejects, both players end up empty-handed. Ample evidence
shows that allocators often offer an equal split, and that recipients
are unwilling to accept offers that leave them with approximately
20% of the pie or less (Camerer and Thaler, 1995). Studies manip-
ulating the size of the bargaining property and the population of
players obtain essentially the same pattern of effects (Hoffman
et al., 1996; Henrich et al., 2006).
As the UG is a typical dyadic bargaining situation, the recipi-
ent automatically compares the amount offered to him with the
amount the allocator would have, and this comparison helps the
recipient to judge whether the division scheme is fair (Handgraaf
et al., 2003). If the amount offered to the recipient compares
unfavorably to the amount left to the allocator, negative feelings
are elicited, and drive the recipient to reject the offer (Sanfey
et al., 2003). In daily life, however, individuals may focus not
only on the outcomes of those who are involved in the current
negotiation, but also on the outcomes of people who are in sim-
ilar roles but in different negotiations (Loewenstein et al., 1989).
For example, in salary negotiations, prospective employees typi-
cally do not compare their wages with those of their employers,
but rather with wages of similarly situated employees (Babcock
et al., 1996). Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) termed the com-
parison in UG between recipients in different allocator–recipient
dyads as social comparison, and found it to affect both the alloca-
tor’s and the recipient’s bargaining behavior. In particular, when
recipients were informed of the average offer of allocators in
other allocator–recipient dyads, the allocators were more likely
to propose higher offers and the recipients were more likely to
reject unequal offers. They suggested that social comparison could
highlight and facilitate attention to fairness norms and affect
fairness consideration and other-regarding behavior in strategic
situations.
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Note that social comparison can be in different directions
(Festinger, 1954): an upward comparison in which individuals
compare themselves with peers in a better standing; a downward
comparison in which individuals compare themselves with peers
in an inferior situation; and a lateral comparison in which individ-
uals compare themselves with peers in similar standings. Down-
ward and upward comparisons may lead to different emotional
responses, including schadenfreude and envy (Takahashi et al.,
2009). They may also affect, in different ways, how individuals
respond to unequal division of asset.
The main purpose of this study was therefore to investi-
gate how upward and downward social comparison modulates
the recipient’s fairness consideration in asset division and how
the brain responds to such modulations. Previous studies have
demonstrated that brain regions such as ventral striatum and/or
ventromedial prefrontal cortex are involved in the social compar-
ison process (Fliessbach et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2009; Dvash
et al., 2010; Tricomi et al., 2010), and these brain activities are
modulated by individual differences, such as social value orien-
tation (Haruno and Frith, 2010). What is lacking is the detailed
knowledge about the temporal characteristics of neural processes
involved in social comparison and its modulation on fairness con-
sideration (see Qiu et al., 2010; Boksem et al., 2011). Here we
developed a variant of UG in which the participant, acting as
a recipient in asset division, was informed not only about the
amount of money (out of 10 Chinese yuan) offered to him by
the allocator in his own allocator–recipient dyad but also the
average amount offered to recipients in other allocator–recipient
dyads. While the offer to the participants could be moderately
unequal (4 out of 10 yuan) or highly unequal (2 out of 10 yuan),
a downward comparison was made possible by the presented
average amount of offers in other dyads being 3 or 1 yuan, respec-
tively; similarly, an upward comparison was made possible by the
average amount being 5 or 3 yuan, respectively. From a ratio-
nal perspective, the potential social comparison should not affect
the participant’s decision to accept or reject the offer as inter-
ests of the participant and of other recipients were independent
from each other. However, it has been demonstrated that fairness
consideration is strongly context-dependent and is constrained
by various social or situational factors (Handgraaf et al., 2003;
Güroglu et al., 2010). It was likely that the upward (and perhaps
the downward) comparison would affect the participant’s decision
to accept or reject the offers, especially when the offer was highly
unequal.
Electrophysiologically, we focused on the medial frontal nega-
tivity (MFN), an Event-related brain potential (ERP) component
that has been implicated in the evaluation of fairness in asset dis-
tribution. The MFN is a negative deﬂection peaking between 200
and 350 ms at frontocentral recording sites. It has been found
to be sensitive to violation of social expectancy or social norms
(Polezzi et al., 2008; Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al.,
2011; Wu et al., 2011; Van der Veen and Sahibdin, 2011). Unequal
offers, i.e., offers deviating from the equal division of asset, elicit
more negative-goingMFN than equal offers in economic exchange
games. The MFN is also more pronounced for lower offers than
for higher offers and this effect is especially true for partici-
pants with high concerns for fairness (Boksem and De Cremer,
2010). For the present study, we would predict that highly unequal
offers could elicit more negative MFN responses than moderately
unequal offers, reﬂecting a general violation of social expectancy.
Moreover, we predicted that social comparison could modulate
the MFN effect for different offers. Boksem et al. (2011) found
that the MFN effect for monetary gains and losses associated with
outcomes in a time-estimation task is more pronounced when an
individual’s own reward is worse than that for others.We therefore
hypothesized that highly unequal offers (2 out of 10 yuan) would
elicit stronger MFN effect when the participants were offered
less than the average amount of offers (3 yuan) to the recipients
in other allocator–recipient dyads, as upward comparison might
strengthen the negative motivational/affective signiﬁcance of the
highly unequal offers.
Another ERP component, the P300, which is the most positive
peak in the period of 200–600 ms, has also been found to be related
to various aspects of outcome evaluation or reward processing.
Some studies found that the P300 is sensitive to the magnitude of
reward, with a more positive response to a larger than to a smaller
reward (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Sato et al., 2005). Other studies
suggested that the P300 is also sensitive to reward valence, with
a more positive amplitude for positive than for negative reward
(Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007; Yeung et al., 2005; Wu and Zhou, 2009;
Leng and Zhou, 2010). In a study on asset division, Wu et al.
(2011) found that the P300 is more positive to equal offers than
to unequal offers. Thus one might predict a similar pattern for the
P300 in this study, although it was not clear how social compari-
son might modulate the pattern of the P300 effect. On the other
hand, Qiu et al. (2010) asked participants to perform a number
estimation task and to receive feedback on their own as well as oth-
ers’monetary reward associated with performance. They obtained
an effect on sustained late positivity potential (LPP) rather than
the P300, for lateral, upward, and downward comparisons. It has
been suggested the LPP may have functional signiﬁcance similar
to that of the P300 (Ito et al., 1998). It was not clear whether we
would observe an LPPor P300 effect for offer type and/or for social
comparison.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-six undergraduate and graduate students (19 females;
mean age 21.92 years, SD= 2.00) participated in the experiment.
Seven students, who were strangers to the participants, were
recruited as confederates. The purpose of using seven confederates
was to reduce the reputation building effect in the repeated-trial
game and to make the experimental setup more realistic since the
participant would play against different allocators in rounds of the
game.
All the participants were right-handed and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. They had no history of neurologi-
cal or psychiatric disorders. Informed consent was obtained from
each participant before the test. The experiment was performed
in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and was approved
by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology, Peking
University. Each participant was paid 45 Chinese yuan (about $
6.9) as basic payment and was informed that additional monetary
reward would be paid according to their performance in the task,
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although in the end all the participants were paid extra 5 yuan on
top of the basic payment.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
The experiment had a 2 × 3 within-participant factorial design,
with the ﬁrst factor referring to offer type (moderately unequal
vs. highly unequal) and the second factor referring to social com-
parison (downward vs. lateral vs. upward). A highly unequal offer
was 2 out of 10 yuan and a moderately unequal offer was 4 out
of 10 yuan. For upward or downward comparison condition, the
average amounts of offers to recipients in other allocator–recipient
dyads were 1 yuan more or less than the offers to the participants,
whereas for lateral comparison, the average amounts were equal
to the offers to the participants.
When a participant came to the laboratory,he/she and the seven
confederates were told that they would sit in separate rooms to ﬁn-
ish a task together through the computer network. By assigning
the participant and the confederates pre-determined cards, they
were ostensively led to separate cubicles to play different roles in
the game. The participant was then told that he/she as well as
another three randomly selected participants would play as recipi-
ents in UG and the other four would play as allocators. He/she was
also informed about the rules of the experiment. That is, at the
beginning of each round, the computer would randomly pair each
recipient with one allocator, and the allocator would then make an
offer on how to divide 10 yuan. Offers in the four different dyads
were independently and simultaneously made by the allocators.
The participant was presented with not only the amount his/her
paired allocator proposed to offer but also the average amount of
offers in the other three allocator–recipient dyads. The participant
was asked to press a button with the index ﬁnger of his/her left
or right hand, without elaborative thinking, to indicate whether
he/she would accept or reject the offer. Note that the participant
was reminded that his/her response to each offer would not be sent
back to the allocator immediately and therefore would not affect
the allocators’ offers in the following rounds.
Each trial began with the presentation of a photo of the 10
yuan bill (2.6˚× 1.3˚) for 500 ms against a black background (see
Figure 1). The sentence “The computer is randomly pairing” in
Chinese (white and Song font, size 32) was presented for another
500 ms, indicating to the participant that four different dyads were
being formed randomly. Then the sentence “Please wait for the
offer” in Chinese (white and Song font, size 32) was presented for
either 500, 750, 1000, 1250 ms, implying that the allocators were
considering how to distribute the assets. After the presentation
of a blank screen for a period of either 400, 500, 600, or 700 ms,
the amount offered to the EEG participant as well as the average
amount offered in other dyads (i.e., the division scheme) were
revealed in two lines of words (e.g., “you 2, average 2,” white and
Song font, size 32) at the center of screen for 1000 ms. The screen
turned blank again for 400 ms, followed by the presentation of two
options, “accept” and “reject” (in words), on the left and right side
of the screen respectively, with the positions of the two options
counterbalanced over participants. The participant was asked to
make the “accept” or “reject” decision as quickly as possible and
his/her choice was highlighted by thickening the white outlines of
the option. The next trial began 1000 ms after the button press.
The participant was seated comfortably about 1.5 m in front
of a computer screen in a dimly lit room. The experiment was
administered on a computer with a Del 22-in. CRT display, using
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral System Inc.) to control
the presentation and timing of the stimuli. Without the partici-
pant’s knowledge,all the offerswere pre-determinedby a computer
program. Each of the six experimental conditions had 40 trials. In
addition, another 120 trials, with the average offers (up to one
decimal place) computed according to different possible offers,
were used as ﬁllers. The 360 trials were randomly mixed and were
divided in equal numbers into 3 blocks. A practice block of 9 trials
was administered before the formal test to familiarize the partici-
pants with the task. Participants were debriefed, paid, and thanked
at the end of the experiment.
EEG RECORDING AND ANALYSIS
EEGs were recorded from 64 scalp sites using tin electrodes
mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Products, Munich, Germany)
according to the international 10–20 system. The vertical elec-
trooculogram (VEOGs) was recorded supra-orbitally from the
right eye. The horizontal EOG (HEOG) was recorded from elec-
trodes placed at the outer canthus of the left eye. All EEGs and
EOGs were referenced online to an external electrode which was
placed on the tip of nose andwere re-referenced ofﬂine to themean
of the left and rightmastoids. Electrode impedancewas kept below
10 kΩ for EOG channels and below 5 kΩ for all other electrodes.
The bio-signals were ampliﬁed with a bandpass from 0.016 to
100 Hz and digitized online with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz.
Separate EEG epochs of 1000 ms (with a 200-ms pre-stimulus
baseline) were extracted ofﬂine, time-locked to the onset of each
division scheme. Ocular artifacts were corrected with an eye-
movement correction algorithm that employs a regression analysis
in combination with artifact averaging (Semlitsch et al., 1986).
Epochs were baseline-corrected by subtracting from each sample
the average activity of that channel during the baseline period.
All the trials in which EEG voltages exceeded a threshold of
±80μV during recording were excluded from further analysis.
For highly unequal offers, on average 36.36 (SD= 4.51), 35.81
(SD= 5.21), and 35.91 (SD= 4.96) trials after artifact rejec-
tion were entered into statistical analysis for the downward,
lateral, and upward social comparison conditions, respectively.
For moderately unequal offers, on average 36.91 (SD= 4.57),
36.09 (SD= 5.07), and 35.82 (SD= 4.55) trials were left for the
three conditions, respectively. The number of trials did not dif-
fer between conditions after artifact rejection. The EEG data were
low-pass ﬁltered below 30 Hz.
For the MFN, we focused on 10 frontal electrodes, F3, F1, Fz,
F2, F4, FC3, FC1, FCz, FC2, and FC4. For the LPP, we focused
on these same frontal electrodes as well as 10 posterior electrodes,
CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, P3, P1, Pz, P2, and P4. We concen-
trated on these electrodes because the MFN effect and the late
positive potentials observed were the largest on these electrodes.
The mean amplitudes in the time window of 270–360 ms (for the
MFN) in the frontal region and the mean amplitudes in the time
window of 450–650 ms (for the LPP) in both the frontal and pos-
terior regions were analyzed. These time windows were selected
according to the classical deﬁnitions for the MFN and the LPP and
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a single trial.
according to visual inspection of waveforms. Analyses of variance
(ANOVAs) were conducted with three within-participant factors:
offer type (highly unequal vs.moderately unequal), social compar-
ison (upward vs. lateral vs. downward), and electrode. If the inter-
action between offer type and social comparison reached statistical
signiﬁcance, further F tests were conducted to test the simple
effects, with electrode as a factor of no-interest. The Greenhouse–
Geisser correction for violation of the assumption of sphericity
was applied where appropriate. The Bonferroni correction was
used for multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
Among the 26 EEG participants, one participant accepted all the
offers and three participants displayed excessive artifacts in EEG
recording. These participants were excluded from data analysis,
leaving 22 participants for the following analysis.
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Rejection rates for different division schemes are presented
in Figure 2. A 2 (offer type: highly unequal vs. moderately
unequal)× 3 (social comparison:downward vs. lateral vs. upward)
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
of offer type, F(1,21)= 50.24, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.71, indicat-
ing that rejection rate for highly unequal offers (mean± SD,
0.54± 0.30) was higher than that for moderately unequal offers
(0.07± 0.11). The main effect of social comparison was sig-
niﬁcant, F(2,42)= 18.07, ε= 0.69, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.46, suggest-
ing that the rejection rate was higher for upward compari-
son (0.48± 0.25) than for either lateral (0.25 ± 0.20) or down-
ward (0.20± 0.19) comparison, as conﬁrmed by post hoc tests,
ps< 0.001. Rejection rates for lateral and downward comparison
did not differ from each other, p> 0.1. Importantly, these main
effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction between offer
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FIGURE 2 |The rejection rate depicted as a function of offer type and
social comparison. Error bars represent standard errors of the means.
type and social comparison, F(2,42)= 5.57, ε= 0.90, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.21. Further tests showed that for highly unequal offers,
there was a main effect of social comparison, F(2,42)= 18.20,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.46, with the rejection rate being higher
for upward comparison (0.78± 0.31) than for either lateral
(0.47± 0.39) or downward comparison (0.38 ± 0.37), ps< 0.001;
for moderately unequal offers, the main effect of social compari-
son was also signiﬁcant, F(2,42)= 6.71, p< 0.05, η2 = 0.24, with
the rejection rate being higher for upward (0.18 ± 0.31) than for
downward comparison (0.01 ± 0.04),p< 0.01. Thus, the rejection
rate was enhanced for upward comparison, and this was especially
the case when the offers to the participants were highly unequal
(Figure 2).
THE MFN
For the mean amplitudes in the 270- to 360-ms time window
(Figures 3A,B), ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of offer
type, F(1,21)= 25.28, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.55, indicating that ERP
responses were more negative going for highly unequal offers
(mean± SD, 0.35± 3.06μV) than for moderately unequal offers
(1.25± 3.16μV). However, there was no signiﬁcant main effect
of social comparison, F(2,42)= 1.74, p> 0.1, nor interaction
between offer type and social comparison, F(2,42)= 1.48, p> 0.1,
indicating that social comparison did not affect the manifestation
of the MFN.
THE LATE POSITIVE POTENTIAL
At the frontal region, ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant main
effect of offer type, F(1,21)= 1.99, p> 0.1, but a signiﬁcant
main effect of social comparison for the mean amplitudes
in the 450- to 650-ms time window, F(2,44)= 6.72, ε= 0.98,
p< 0.01, η2 = 0.24, suggesting that the LPP was less posi-
tive for downward (1.53± 3.24μV) and upward comparison
(1.46± 3.44μV) than for lateral comparison (2.56± 3.19μV),
p< 0.05 and p< 0.01, respectively. Moreover, this main effect was
qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction between offer type and social
comparison, F(2,42)= 3.36, ε= 0.95, p< 0.05, η2 = 0.14. Fur-
ther tests showed that moderately unequal offers (2.17± 3.51μV)
elicited more positive-going responses than highly unequal
offers (0.90± 3.18μV) in downward comparison (Figure 3C),
F(1,21)= 11.93, p< 0.01, η2 = 0.36, whereas this contrast did
not produce signiﬁcant effects for either lateral or upward com-
parison, both F(1,21)< 1. On the other hand, for moderately
unequal offers, social comparison did not affect LPP responses,
F(2,42)= 2.52, ε= 0.99, p = 0.09; for highly unequal offers, social
comparison did have a signiﬁcant effect, F(2,42)= 9.63, ε= 0.96,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.31, with LPP for downward (0.90 ± 3.18μV)
and upward comparison (1.53± 3.53μV) being less positive-
going than for lateral comparison (2.61± 3.12μV), p< 0.01 and
p< 0.05, respectively.
At theposterior region,ANOVArevealedonly a signiﬁcantmain
effect of social comparison, F(2,42)= 5.33, ε= 0.92, p = 0.01,
η2 = 0.20, indicating that the mean amplitudes were less positive
for upward comparison (5.63± 3.14μV) than for lateral compar-
ison (6.76± 2.96μV), p< 0.01. The mean amplitudes for lateral
comparison were intermediate (6. 12 ± 2.86μV) and did not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly from other conditions, ps> 0.1. Neither the main
effect of offer type nor the interaction between offer type and
social comparison was signiﬁcant, F(1,21)= 1.49, p> 0.1, and F
(2,42)= 1.39, p> 0.1, respectively.
DISCUSSION
This study demonstrated that social comparison inﬂuences recip-
ients’ behavioral reactions as well as their brain responses to
unequal asset allocation schemes in the UG. Participants were
more likely to reject division schemes when the recipients in other
dyads were offered more than themselves (i.e., upward compar-
ison), particularly when the offers were highly unequal. Electro-
physiologically, highly unequal offers elicited more negative-going
ERP responses than moderately unequal offers in an earlier MFN
time window (270–360 ms), and this effect was not modulated by
social comparison. In a later time window (450–650 ms), the late
positive potential (LPP) was more positive for moderately unequal
offers than for highly unequal offers when the other recipients
were offered less than the participants were (i.e., downward com-
parison). These ﬁndings revealed the temporal characteristics of
neural activity in social comparison and fairness consideration,
complimenting previous fMRI studies that localized brain regions
involved in social comparison (Dvash et al., 2010; Haruno and
Frith,2010;Tricomi et al., 2010) and fairness consideration (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Güroglu et al., 2010).
Previous studies suggest that upward comparison, i.e., being
worse off than others, is motivationally salient and threatens
self-esteem, causing individuals to feel inferior to the others
(Wood, 1996). Such negative emotions elicited by upward com-
parison might drive the recipients to reject more often the division
schemes, whether the offers are highly or moderately unequal and
even though such costly punishment of the allocators might lead
them and the allocators both empty-handed. Nevertheless, this
effect of social comparison was more pronounced when the offers
were highly unequal. Upward comparison deepens the experi-
enced negative feeling caused by the unequal offers deviating from
the equity rule in asset distribution, leading to more rejections to
the division schemes. This ﬁnding is consistent with Bohnet and
Zeckhauser (2004) which demonstrated that social comparison
facilitates recipients’ attention to the fairness norm.
The ﬁnding of a MFN effect, with more negative-going
responses to highly unequal offers than to moderately unequal
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FIGURE 3 | (A) ERP responses time-locked to the onset of different offers at
the midline Fz, FCz, and CPz. The shaded 270–360ms time window was for
the calculation of the mean amplitudes of the MFN. The shaded 450–650ms
time window was for the calculation of the mean amplitudes of the LPP; (B)
topographic maps for the MFN effect; (C) topographic maps for the LPP
effect.
offers, replicated previous studies in which the MFN effect
increased with unfairness in economic games (Polezzi et al., 2008;
Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Hewig et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2011;
VanderVeen and Sahibdin, 2011). This effectmay reﬂect the detec-
tion of social expectancy violation as egalitarian distribution of
assets is an expected social norm (Messick and Sentis, 1983; Fehr
and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). During evolu-
tion, the human brain may have developed speciﬁc mechanisms
to detect ongoing deviations from social norms (Montague and
Lohrenz, 2007). These mechanisms might share the same neural
correlates as those engaged in predicting errors during non-social
reinforcement learning (Harris and Fiske, 2010). The MFN can
therefore reﬂect not only the encoding of prediction errors for
monetary reward or performance feedback but also violations of
expectancy toward social norms.
A perhaps surprising ﬁnding in this study was that social com-
parison had no obvious effect on the MFN responses to division
schemes. This absence of a social comparison effect appears to be at
oddswithBoksemet al. (2011) andQiu et al. (2010) inwhich social
comparison modulated the MFN or MFN-like responses in out-
come evaluation. It is possible that the discrepancy between these
ﬁndings is due to different paradigms employed in the studies. In
both Boksem et al. (2011) and Qiu et al. (2010), the participants
performed a gambling task in which one’s own outcome as well as
the other’s were presented simultaneously and the outcome for the
participant was deterministic. In a recent study, Wu et al. (2011)
also found that the social distance between the allocator and the
recipient, i.e., being friends vs. strangers, could modulate MFN
responses to equal and unequal offers in the dictator game (DG).
DG is similar to UG except that the recipient owns no right but has
to accept any offer from the allocator. This ﬁnding, together with
Boksem et al. (2011) and Qiu et al. (2010), suggests that the social
context can affect the MFN responses when reward is determinis-
tic. However, in the UG paradigm adopted here, as the participants
can decide to either accept or reject the offers, the outcome is nego-
tiable. The (un)certainty of the outcome may affect the extent the
participants process the affective/motivational signiﬁcance of the
outcome. The system may adopt a “wait-and-see” strategy and
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conduct deeper assessment of offers only at a later stage involv-
ing more top-down processes (Cunningham et al., 2003; Leng and
Zhou, 2010; Ma et al., 2011). That is, fairness consideration in UG
can be differentiated into two stages: an earlier, semi-automatic
stage in which the fairness of offers are considered at an abstract
level with reference to long-established social norms but with-
out much reference to personal interests; and a later, cognitive
appraisal stage in which social factors comes into play (Moore and
Loewenstein, 2004; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Leng and Zhou, 2010).
Recent ERP studies employing economic games have indicated
that the P300 is sensitive to different offers, with its magnitude less
positive to unequal offers (Wu et al., 2011). In the present study,we
found the late positivity potential (LPP), rather than the P300,was
modulated by social comparison. Although the LPP and the P300
may differ in temporal dynamics and scalp distribution, a num-
ber of studies indicated that they share similar functions in social
evaluation and attitude categorization (see Hajcak et al., 2010 for
a review). The P300 is generally believed to be related to processes
of attentional allocation (Gray et al., 2004; Linden, 2005) and/or
to high-level motivational/affective evaluation (Yeung and Sanfey,
2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). Similarly, the LPP has been impli-
cated in the process of social evaluation, with enhanced positive
amplitudes reﬂecting increased motivated attention (van Hooff
et al., 2010). For instance, the LPP has been found to be largest for
stimuli that are motivationally relevant, receive the highest reports
of affective experience, and prompt the largest levels of autonomic
arousal (Schupp et al., 2004; Briggs and Martin, 2009).
Moderately unequal offers evoked more positive LPP than
highly unequal offers when the recipients in the other dyads were
offered less than the participants were. This ﬁnding is consis-
tent with the P300/LPP results in the previous ERP studies using
economic games (Wu et al., 2011). It may reﬂect differential distri-
bution of attentional resources to the two types of offers that had
different affective/motivational signiﬁcance. However, the offer
type effect on LPP appeared mostly in the downward comparison
conditions, not in the lateral or upward comparison conditions
(Figure 3C). It is possible that in the present setup the LPP is more
sensitive to social comparison rather than to offer type. The partic-
ipants cared more and devoted more attentional resources to the
comparison between the offers to themselves and the offers to their
peers than to the comparison between the offers to themselves and
the amount left to the proposers. This dominance seeking (Rusti-
chini, 2008) captured attention and overshadowed the offer type
effect on LPP in the lateral and upward comparison conditions.
When the participants were in advantageous positions compared
with their peers (e.g., in downward comparison),more attentional
resources were left to the comparison between the offers to the par-
ticipants and the amounts left to the proposers and then the offer
type effect emerged.
Note that the pattern of the LPP effect outlined above was
inconsistent with the pattern of effect in rejection rates (Figure 2),
as the offer type effect on LPP was absent in both lateral and
upward comparison conditions whereas the rejection rates for the
lateral comparison conditions were more similar to the down-
ward comparison conditions, rather than to the upward com-
parison conditions. The latter pattern of the rejection rates was
also observed in another behavioral study in which more levels of
offer type were included (unpublished data). The apparent con-
tradiction between the ERP pattern and the behavioral data may
be due to different processes underlying the electrophysiological
and behavioral responses. The electrophysiological measurement
was time-locked to the presentation of division schemes that are
evaluated promptly, whereas the behavioral responses may involve
more elaborated processes, including weighting pros and cons of
rejection (i.e., strategic consideration).
CONCLUSION
By providing participants with highly or moderately unequal
schemes of asset division in the UG and by informing them the
average offers to their peers in other allocator–recipient dyads, we
found that the participants’ rejections of the unequal offers were
modulated by the comparison between the offers to the partici-
pants and the offers to their peers. Participants were more likely to
reject division schemeswhen theywere offered less than their peers
were, and this was especially the case when the offers to the partic-
ipants were highly unequal. Electrophysiologically, highly unequal
offers elicited more negative-going MFN responses than moder-
ately unequal offers in an early time window (270–360 ms) and
this effect was not obviously modulated by social comparison.
In a later time window (450–650 ms), the LPP was more posi-
tive for moderately unequal offers than for highly unequal offers
in downward comparison, whereas this effect was absent in lat-
eral or upward comparison. These ﬁndings suggest that the brain
responses to the fairness in asset division entails both an earlier
(semi-) automatic process in which the brain responds to fairness
at an abstract level and a later appraisal process in which factors
related to social comparison and fairness norms come into play.
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